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Chakravarty, Dutta and Weymark (1985) present axioms íor an ethical 
index of relative in  come mobility in a two period world. This paper suggests a 
decomposition oí this index into two terms:  i)  an index oí structural mobility 
which  captures  differences  in  the  inequality  of  the  cross-section  income 
distributions, and ii) an index oí exchange mobility  which captures changes in 
relative incomes. These concepts are shown to be useíul in the evaluation oí an 
income tax system which induces rerankings between the pre-tax and the after-
tax income distributions, as well as in other contexts where there are reorderings 
between individuals. INTRODUcnON 
Compared to  agrarian society, which has occupied most  of  historical 
times, our growth-oriented industrial society is presumed to be socially mobile 
and  egalitarian(1).  The  recent  availability  of  longitudinal  data  makes 
increasingly possible the measurement  of such a central concept as  mobility. 
The  problem  is  that,  compared  with  the  neighboring  area  of  inequality 
measurement, there is les s professional agreement about how to  measure this 
dynamic concept. 
Social mobility is,  of course,  a many-sided phenomenon.  Among  the 
approaches developed by economists,  we find it useful to distinguish between 
two  types. The first  approach  considers  explicitly  the  transition  mechanism 
responsible for the  time  path of the  variable  of interest.  Such mechanism is 
often  represented  by  a  transition  matrix  which  shows  the  fraction  of  the 
population which moves from one category to  another in one time periodo In 
this  context,  an index of  mobility  is  defined as  a real function  on the  set  of 
transition matrices(2). Alternatively, mobility measures are also derived from 
other simple stochastic specifications of the transition mechanism(3). 
As  pointed  out  in  Shorrocks  (1978b),  these  attempts  are  mainly 
concerned  with  stock  variables,  interpreted  to  inc1ude  soc~al  status  and 
occupation as  well  as  wealth and the  assets  of  firms.  The  second  approach, 
which we follow in this  paper, is  meant for  a less abstract setting where the 
variable of interest is income. Abstracting from the transition mechanism,  one 
simply studies in a straightforward way the  changes that can be observed in 
1 longitudinal data sets: changes in cross-section income inequality and changes 
in relative  incomes  or in absolute income  differences.  Indices of  relative  or 
absolute mobility are sensitive  to  changes in relative  incomes  or in income 
differences, respectively. 
We  can  distinguish  between  descriptive  and  normative  income 
mobility measures(4). Naturally, descriptive measures  cannot  tell  us whether 
mobility  is or is not socially  desirable. In this  paper, we are  concerned  with 
ethical indices of relative income mobility which are capable of addressing this 
issue. 
Ethical indices  are  derived  from  explicit  social  evaluation  functions 
(SEF,  for short). In a static context,  the  SEF  is  simply defined on the space of 
one-period income distributions. In the present dynamic context, what the SEF 
domain should be is not an obvious question.  Given a decision in this regard, 
it is  important  to  know whether in order to  construct  meaningful  mobility 
measures we need SEFs which incorporate new value judgments. 
In his  seminal  contribution  in this  area,  King  (1983)  proposes  a  two 
period model where  the  SEF  is  defined  on  individual  incomes  during  the 
second period and  rank  reversals  between the  two  periods.  Therefore,  new 
value judgments about the welfare effects of rank reversals are required. In this 
paper, we follow the ethical approach due to Chakravarty, Dutta and Weymark 
(1985),  or  CDW  for  short.  They  compare  the  actual  time  path  of  incomes 
received  over  a  number  of  periods with  a  hypothetical  benchmark  which 
maintains  constant  over  time  the  relative  positions  occupied  by  the 
individuals  in  the  actual  first-period  income  distribution.  For  operational 
2 reasons, CDW also restrict themselves to a two period model. Contrary to King 
(1983)'s, CDW's SEF is defined on aggregate incomes over the two periods and 
does not include any new value judgment beyond the traditional ones. 
In this framework, we find it essential to distinguish between two types 
of  rank  reversals  ignored  in  CDW:  rank  reversals  between  the  first- and 
second-period  income  distributions,  which  we caH  permutations; and  rank 
reversals  between  the  first-period  and  the  aggregate  income  distributions, 
which we caH rerankings. The distinction can be illustrated by means of a pair 
of simple examples. In both examples the first period income distribution is (2, 
4).  In example  1,  the  second period income  distribution  is  (4,  3).  Therefore, 
there  is  a permutation,  but since  the  aggregate income  distribution  is  (6,  7), 
there is no reranking. In example 2,  the second period income  distribution is 
(7,  O),  representing  the  same  total  income  growth  as  before.  The  aggregate 
income  distribution  is  now  (9,  4),  so  there  is  both  a  permutation  and  a 
reranking. 
Using this distinction,  we offer a novel decomposition of a version of 
CDW's  relative  mobility  index into  two  terms:  the  first  term,  which we caH 
structural  11lobility,  captures  the  welfare  effect  of  the  change  in  inequality 
between  the  aggregate and  the  completely  immobile  distribution,  once  aH 
permutations have been eliminated. The second term, which we caH exchange 
mobility, measures the welfare impact of permutations between the first- and 
the second-period income  distributions,  with or without  rerankings  between 
the  initial  and  the  aggregate income  distributions.  We  do not  impose  any 
value  judgments  either  on  permutations  or  rerankings.  However,  in  the 
3 presence of permutations,  we show that exchange mobility  is always socially 
desirable. On the other hand, in the presence of rerankings, we show that there 
exists  a  second-period  income  distribution  which  implies  the  same  rate  of 
income growth, the same income mobility, but no rerankings at aH. 
These  ideas,  developed  in  an  income  growth  context,  have  an 
immediate  application  to  the  evaluation  of income  tax  systems  and  other 
interesting problems. 
The  paper is.  organized in five  sections.  The  first  two  sections  are 
devoted  to  a  discussion  of  the  assumptions  and  the  decomposition  of  the 
income  mobility  model in the  homogeneous  case. The  third section  applies 
our decomposition of overall mobility into structural and exchange mobility in 
an income  tax context.  The fourth  section briefly reviews  other applications, 
while the fifth section concludes. 
1. THE MODEL IN THE HOMOGENEOUS CASE 
Let the time interval [tÜ' ... ,trJ be partitioned into m equal subperiods [tk_ 
l,  ...  ,tk), k = 1, ... ,m, where mis a fixed exogenous integer. We  refer to  [tk_1, ... ,tk) as 
the  kth-period.  Let there be i  =  1, ... , n  individuals.  For period k,  let  y~  be 
individual's i income.  The income  distribution in period k is denoted by Yk  = 
1  n  n 
(Yk  '···'Yk  ).  Let D  =  R++  be the strictIy  positive  orthant in n-dimensional 
4 Euclidean  space.  Sequences  of  income  distributions,  Y  =  (Yl, ...  ,yrrJEJYll,  are 
called income structures. 
Each individual i is characterized byan income stream yi  =  (y~  ,. ..  ,y~ ) 
Over the whole time interval  [tÜ' ...  ,t~, individual i receives aggregate income 
y~  =  S(yi).  One  of  the  simplest  aggregation functions  is  the  one  used in 
.  i 
Shorrocks  (1978a),  S(yI)  = Lk ak Yk  with ak denoting  the  common  weight 
given to every individual income in period k, and Lk ak =  1(5). We refer to the 
income distribution Ya = (y!  ,. .. ,y: ) as the aggregate distribution. 
The ethical approach to measuring income  mobility  in CDW  uses an 
intertemporal social evaluation function  (SEF for short), W:  Dm -+ Rl, where 
W (Y)  is the  social  welfare level  associated with the  income  structure  Y.  The 
income mobility concept we wish to  explore is  the one embodied in a welfare 
comparison  of the actual income  structure Yand a  hypothetical  benchmark 
structure Yb: the income structure which would have resulted in the absence of 
mobility given the first period distribution Yt. That is  to  say, mobility  indices 
are obtained by comparing the  actual level  of  social  welfare  W (Y)  with  the 
level of social welfare W (Yb) which would have obtained with the benchmark 
structure Ybo 
To make this comparison operational,  CDW  make  the  following  two 
fundamental  assumptions referring to  the  notion  of complete immobility in 
the relative case and the nature of the SEF W (.), respectively. 
s A.  1.  Given  Y  =  (Yl, ...  ,ym>,  let  J1(Yk)  be  the  mean  of  the  income 
distribution in period k. We say that Y exhibits complete  relative  immobility if 
individual income shares are maintained  through time  equal to the income 
shares in the first period distribution Yl' Le. 
so that J1(Ybk)  =  J1(Yk)  for aH  k. Consequently, the aggregate distribution for this 
benchmark structure, denoted by Ybt  gives each individual  the  same share of 
actual total income as they receive in period 1(6). 
The only features of the  income  structures Y and Yb relevant  for  the 
welfare comparisons are their aggregate distributions Ya and Yb' FormaHy: 
A. 2. There exists a SEF W:  D - Rl such that 
W (Ya) = W (Y) for aH Y in l)ID. 
A mobility index assigns a mobility value to each income structure Y in 
Dm, i.e. it is a function M: Dm_ Rl. CDW suggest a class Q  of indices of relative 
mobility of the form 
(1) 
1 
where <\>:  R++  - Rl is a continous increasing function with <\>(1)  = 0(7). Indices 
in this class are ordinal1y equivalent to each other and to the ratio of the actual 
aggregate distribution welfare level to the aggregate distribution welfare level 
6 in the  hypothetical  immobile  benchmark  structure  Yb.  The  normalization 
employed ensures  that an immobile  income  structure is  assigned a mobility 
value of zero. 
Assumption A.  2.  is,  of course,  questionable.  Consider the  following 
example taken from CDW.  There  are two income  structures,  Y =  {(2,2),  (2,2), 
(2,2)} and y# =  {(2,2), (3,1),  (l,3)}. The first structure exhibits no mobility, while 
the second one also exhibits no mobility for any mobility index derived from 
an intertemporal  SEF  satisfying A.  2.  and  the  following  specification  of  the 
aggregation function  S(.):  y~  where  ak =  1 for  all  k(8).  This 
example  helps  to  show  that  the  acceptability  of  A.  2.  may  depend  on  the 
specification  of S(.).  In  this  paper  we  want  to  emphasize  those  aspects  of 
income  mobility  which  do  not  depend  on  the  aggregation  function  S(.). 
Therefore,  as  in CDW  we  restrict  ourselves  to  the  two  period  case.  In this 
context, A. 2. is a more acceptable restriction. Formally, we adopt: 
i  i  i 
A. 3. We  assume that m = 2 and Ya  = Yl  + Y2  for each i. 
Both periods are then reflected in the construction of the mobility indices, the 
first-period  distribution  through  its  effect  on  the  aggregate  benchmark 
distribution  y~ and the  second-period distribution  through  its  effect  on  the 
actual aggregate distribution Ya. 
It is a natural strategy to pay attention in the first place to  the simplest 
but relevant  case.  We  hope  that  the  applications  we  present in  this  paper 
justify the interest of the two period case. On the other hand, recall that this is 
7 the  case  assumed  also  by  other  authors:  for  instance,  King  (1983)  and 
Markandya (1984) within the normative approach, 
The next assumption  refers  to  the  welfare  evaluation  of  one-period 
incomes. 
A.  4. There exists a SEF defined on one-period incomes,  W k:  D  -+ R  1, 
and this fundion is the same as the m-period SEF W,  i.e. 
The  identification  of  one-period  evaluations  with  m-period  ones  is  also 
questionable but it greatly simplifies our work. Assumption A.  4.  is taken also 
from CDW and, again, it is probably more acceptable in the two period case(9). 
Among the members of the class Q, CDW point out that one mobility 
index stands out because of its simple in  terpretation. This index is obtained ~ 
setting </>(s)  = s - 1 in (1). In this case, we have that 
(2) 
The remaining properties of M(· ) depend on additional assumptions 
on W (.  ).  For our analytical purposes, in the  relative  case we only  need that 
W (.)  can  be  expressed  solely  in  terms  of  two  statistics  of  the  income 
distribution, the mean and a scale invariant index of relative inequality IR(.  ); 
that is, we only need that there exists a fundion V:  R2 -+ R1 such that 
8 W (y) = v  (~(y), IR (y»  (3) 
with V (.  ) increasing in the first argument and decreasing in the second one. 
Wee  say that W (.  ) is regular if it is continous  and S-concave.  When  W (.  ) is 
regular, Dutta and Esteban (1992) show that equation (3) is satisfied if and only 
if W(.) is increasing along rays from the origin and weakly-homothetic(10). 
However, for operational purposes it is convenient to specify the trade-
off  between  efficiency  and  distributional  considerations.  Consequently,  we 
adopt: 
A. 5. The SEF W (.  ) can be expressed as:  W (y) = ~(y)(1- ley»~. 
Thus, social welfare is seen to  be the product of the mean and an adjustment 
factor which varies inversely with an appropriate index of relative  inequality 
1(·  ). For example, CDW assume that W (.  ) is homothetic.  In this case, it is well 
known that we can write 
W (y) = ~(y){l - IAKS(y)}, 
where  lAKS(.)  is  the  relative  inequality  index  obtained  according  to  the 
Atkinson-Kolm-Sen procedure which uses the notion of an equally distributed 
income(ll). Alternatively, because of its good additive separability properties 
we may use 
W (y) = ~t(y){1 - 1 1  (y)}, 
9 where I1(y) is the first relative inequality index suggested by Theil(12). In either 
case, the CDW mobility index defined in (2) becomes 
(4) 
with 1(' ) equal to IAKS(.  ) or 11('  )(13). In what follows, we will assume that 1 -
I(Ya) > O. 
11. STRUcrURAL AND EXCHANGE MOBILITY 
Contrary to descriptive mobility indices, our ethical index allows us to 
determine  whether  the  observed  income  changes  are  socially  desirable. 
Consider the following two examples. In the first one, denoted by El, Y =  {(2, 4), 
(4,3)} and Ya  = (6, 7). In the second example, denoted by E2, y# = {(2, 4), (2, S)} 
and Ya # = (4,9). The initial situation is the same in both examples, Y1  = Y1 # = (2, 
4). Since  fA(Y2)  =  fA(Y2 #) =  7/2, the rate of income growth is also the same in El 
and E2. However, it is clear that 
while 
M(Y) ={I(2, 4) - 1(6, 7)}/ {l-1(2, 4)} > O 
M(Y#) ={I(2, 4) - 1(4, 9)}/ {l-1(2, 4)} < O. 
The  reduction in inequality in Ya  relative  to  Y1  causes  M(Y)  to  be positive, 
reflecting an increase in social welfare. But the  increase in inequality in Ya # 
relative to Y1 # causes M(Y#) to be negative, reflecting a social welfare loss. 
10 Apparently, our mobility  index reflects  welfare changes due solely to 
changes in inequality from the initial to the final situation. One of the points 
of this paper is that this is not the case at aH.  Upon doser inspection,  income 
changes in El give rise to two effects: a change in cross-section inequality from 
1(1,  3)  to  1(4,  3),  and  a  permutation  of  the  ordering  of individual  incomes 
between the first- and the second-period income distributions. In Yl individual 
1 is poorer than 2, while in Y2 individual 1 is richer. 
At this  point~ it is  useful  to  consider a third example,  denoted by E3. 
Now the income structure is Y*  = {(2, 4), (5, 2)} and Ya * = (7, 6). Both the initial 
situation and the  rate of income  growth coincide  with those  of examples  El 
and E2. Given the symmetry of 1(.), we have that 1(6,  7)  =  1(7, 6). Therefore,  we 
ha  ve that M(Y*)  = M(Y). The (important) novelty in relation to El, is that in E3 
there is both a permutation between the  two period distributions Yl * and Y2 *, 
and what we call a reranking between the first-period and the aggregate income 
distributions, Yl * and Ya *,  respectively. 
Examples El and E3 suggest that our mobility index can be decomposed 
in two terms. One capturing the welfare change due to the change in inequality 
between the cross-section distributions Yl and Y2 without any permutation, and 
a  second  one  capturing  the  permutation  effect  with  or  without  reranking 
between Yl  and Ya.  In our  opinion,  this  distinction  foHows  closely  the  one 
found in the sociologicalliterature between strudural mobility  and exchange 
mobility(14). Therefore, from a formal point of view what we wish to achieve 
is  a decomposition of the mobility index M(· ) into  structural mobility  SM(· ) 
11 and exchange mobility EM(· ).  For that purpose, it is important to retain the 
following  terminology.  Given an income  structure Y  =  (Y1'  Y2)ED2,  we will 
always consider that Y1 is ordered according to the "less than or equal" relation. 
Whenever  Y1 and Y2 are not equally ordered, we say that there has been sorne 
permutation between them;  whenever  Y1  and  Ya  =  Y1  +  Y2  are not  equally 
ordered, we say that there has been sorne reranking between thern.  Of course, 
the reranking between Yl and Ya irnplies the perrnutation between Yl and Y2  (as 
in EJ), but not the contrary (as in El). Finally, given any income structure Y = 
.  . 
(Yl' Y2)EIY, define Y e=  Yl +  Y2  ' where Y2  is the second-period distribution Y2 
ordered as the initial  distribution Yl.  Arrned with these  concepts,  we suggest 
the following decomposition of our mobility index: 
M(Y) = SM(Y) + EM(Y), 
where 
SM(Y) = {W(Ye) - W (Yb)}/W(y.,) = {I(Y1) - I(Ye)}/ {l- I(Y1)}  (5) 
EM(Y) = {W(Ya) - W (ye)}/W(Yb) = (I(ye) - l(ya)}/ {l-l(Yl)}.  (6) 
Remark 1. Since I(Y2  ) =  I(Y2) and 
we have that 
(7) 
That is, the structural rnobility captures the welfare change due to the change 
in cross-section inequality. 
12 Consider the case in which there is no permutation between Yl  and Y2' 
so that Y2  = Y2'  and Ye= Ya' In King (1983)' s model there is no mobility. In our 
case, aH  mobility is structural mobility which, by (7),  in general it is different 
from zero. 
In the presence of sorne perrnutation between Yl  and Y2'  we can show 
that  exchange  mobility  is  always  socially  desirable  (See  Theorem  1.  i». 
Moreover, in a number of cases we can sign M(' ).  In the  first place, if I(Yl)  ~ 
I(Y2)'  then by (7)  strudural rnobility  is  non-negative.  Hence overaH  mobility 
will be positive. An exarnple of this situation is  provided by El, illustrated in 
Figure 1. 
Figure 1 around here 
When I(Yl) <  I(Y2)'  the sign of M(· ) depends on the relative strength of EM(' ) 
and SM(' ). But if there is no reranking  between Yl  and Ya  we can show that 
M(' ) is positive. ForrnalIy, we have: 
. 
Theorem 1. Let Y = (Yl' Y2)ED2 such that Y2  ~ Y2  and  Y e  ~ Ya'  i.e.  such 
that there is sorne permutation between Yl and Y2' 
i) EM(Y) > O. 
ii) If  I(Yl)  ~  I(Y2) or there is no reranking between Yl  and Ya' then M(Y) > 
O. 
(See the Proof in the Appendix). 
13 Consider the exarnple E4, illustrated in Figure 2, where y& = {(2, 4), (7, 
O)} and Ya & =  (9,4). There is a reranking between Y1&  and Ya & and, therefore, a 
perrnutation  between Y1&  and Y2&  which causes  EM(Y&)  >  O.  On the  other 
hand, since I(Y1&) < I(Y2&) we have that SM(Y&) <  O. It turns out that the SM(' ) 
is stronger than EM(· ) so that M(Y&) <  O. 
Figure 2 around here 
In  the  presence  of rerankings,  we can show  that  there  exists  sorne 
reaHocation  of the  second-period total incorne  which gives rise  to  the  sarne 
rnobility but with no reranking at aH. The elirnination of rerankings do  es away 
with sorne or aH perrnutations, causing the exchange rnobility to decrease or to 
disappear  altogether.  Overall  rnobility  rernains  constant  because  the  new 
second-period income distribution has less inequality than the original one, a 
change that implies an increase in structural rnobility which exactly offsets the 
reduction in exchange rnobility. Forrnally, we have: 
Theorem 2. Let Y = (Y1' Y2)EIY so that there is sorne reranking between 
* 
Y1 and Ya' Then, there exists sorne Y2  ED with the following properties: 
*  * 
ii) M(Y*) = M (Y), where Y*  = (YI' Y2  ); 
*  *  * 
iii) There is no reranking between Y1 and Ya  =  YI + Y2  ; 
(See the Proof in the Appendix). 
14 If  we are interested at aH in the social welfare during the second period, 
then Theorem  2 ensures that, in the presence of rerankings,  we  can always 
increase  the  original  second  period  welfare  maintaining  overaH  mobility 
constant. 
The final  question  in this  Section  is  the foHowing:  given an income 
structure Y = (Yl' Y2)' what happens when we switch the roles of Yl  and Y2?  The 
answer  is  that  all  depends  on  the  relationship  between I(Yl)  and  I(Y2):  the 
smaller the inequality in the initial situation,  the greater the income  mobility. 
Forrnally, we have: 
Rernark  2.  Let Y = (Yl'  Y2)  with Ya  = Yl  +  Y2'  Assurne,  without  loss  of 
generality, that there is sorne  perrnutation between Yl and Y2'  and let Y e = Yl  + 
Y2  . Define Y*= (Yl *,  Y2 *)  where Yl * = Y2'  ordered according to  the "less than or 
equal"  relation, and Y2 * = Yl  ordered so  that Ya *  = Yl *+  Y2 *  = Ya'  . Therefore, 
I(Ya  *) = I(ya). Notice al so that Y/ = Ye" Then we have that 
and 
Hence, 
M(Y) = SM(Y) + EM(Y)  ~ EM(*) = SM(Y*) + EM(Y*) ~  I(Yl)}  ~ I(Y2)' 
(  < 
lS 111. THE IN  COME TAX MODEL 
111. 1. The Homogeneous Case 
Let us assume that we have a set of i = 1, ... , n homogeneous individuals 
that can only differ in their pre-tax income. Let us denote by y =  (yl,  ... , yn) and x 
= (xl, ... , xn) the pre-tax and the after-tax income distributions, respectively, and 
let T =  (tI,.  .. , tn) be the income tax vector.  Then,  x =  y-T. We  say that a tax 
vector T is progressive, proportional or regressive in a relative sense according 
to whether I(T)  ~ I(y), respectively. We  refer to Y = {x, T}ED2 as an income-tax 
pair, where x is ordered by the "1ess tan or equal" relation. 
In the  terminology  of the  previous  section,  an income-tax  pair is  an 
income  structure where the aggregate situation is  seen to  be Ya  =  X + T  =  y. 
Applying  the  definition  given  in  equation  (2)  and  taking  into  account 
assumption A.  5,  The CDW  measure of income  mobility  induced by the  tax 
system is 
M(Y) = {W (y) - W (xW} / W(xb) = {I(x) - I(y)} / {l- I(x)}.  (8) 
The numerator in (8) is the negative of the redistributive effect (RE,  for short) 
usually defined as RE(Y) =  I(y) - I(x) in the income tax literature. Therefore,  it 
seems convenient to change the definition in (8) to: 
M(Y) = {W(x) - W (y~}/W(Yb)  = {I(y) - I(x)}/ {l- I(y)},  (9) 
where Yb is the hypothetical income  distribution which would have  resulted 
from a proportional income  tax with the same tax revenue as T.  According to 
16 equation (9), the in  come  mobility induced by the tax system leads to a welfare 
improvement if and only if there is a positive RE,  Le., a reduction in the after 
tax income inequality. 
Notice that, given x = y- T, any reranking between yand x implies the 
existence of permutations between x and T. However, if marginal tax rates are 
less than one, then it is impossible to  have any rerankings between the pre-tax 
and the after-tax income distributions. Even without rerankings between yand 
x  there  can  be  permutations  between  x  and  T.  But  this  would  lead  to 
permutations between yand T, implying that a poorer pre-tax individual pays 
a greater income tax than a richer one. In the present homogeneous  word, we 
rule out such absolutely regressive tax systems. In this case we have that 
I(y)E{Min(I(x), I(T)), Max(I(x), I(T)))}, 
so that 
M(Y) ~  O  ~  RE(Y) ~  O  ~  I(T) ~  I(x) ~  I(T) ¿ I(y).  (10) 
Equation  (10)  indicates  that  the  sign of  the  RE  -and hence  the  sign of the 
mobility index- depends on whether the tax vector is  progressive, proportional 
or regressive, a well known resu1t(15). 
111. 2. The Heterogeneous Case 
In the real world, tax units may differ in income  andj  or non-income 
characteristics,  like  marriage status, number  of  dependents,  income  sources, 
housing tenure, or financial asset structure. Moreover, real life tax systems can 
be thought of as a pair consisting of a progressive tax tariff, and a complex set of 
exemptions,  allowances,  and tax credits.  The  effect  of  such  a  tax  system on 
17 heterogeneous tax units may very well give rise to the thorny issues relating to 
horizontal inequality. 
The principIe of horizontal equality requires equal treatment of equals 
by the  tax  system.  But  the  application  of  this  principIe  is  plagued  with 
difficulties. In the first place, in a heterogeneous world there can be differences 
between the notions of equals used by the analyst and by the fiscal  authority. 
Then,  whatever the method  used to  measure  horizontal  inequities,  we are 
likely  to  include  in  our  estimates  what  we  call  "unintended  horizontal 
inequality,,(16). In the second place, independently of the notion  of equals we 
ca re to use, we must confront the well known difficulty that, in the real world, 
we find  very few  identical tax units  in  the  agreed upon  space.  One  way to 
approach this difficulty is to  couch  the analysis in terms  of "similars"  rather 
than "exact equals"(17). An alternative approach consists of the identification of 
horizontal equality with the preservation of the pre-tax income  distribution's 
ordering. In our notation,  Plotnick  (1982,  1985) and King  (1983),  for  example, 
propose to measure horizontal inequality as the extent of rerankings between y 
and x. In our opinion, there can be unequal treatment of equals which does not 
give rise to rerankings. Nevertheless,  it is c1ear that any reranking constitutes 
prima  Jacie  evidence  of  an horizontal  inequity  worth  worrying  about  and 
measured for its own sake. 
We  know  that  rerankings  between  y  and  x  imply  permutations 
between x and T. But we have seen that there can be permutations between x 
and T without rerankings, in which case we have permutations between yand 
18 T implying that a poorer pre-tax individual  pays a greater income  tax than a 
richer one. We will eventualIy distinguish between these two phenomena, but 
we must start by presenting the definitions of structural and exchange mobility. 
Given the income-tax pair Y =  (x, T)EIY,  let T' be the  vector T ordered as x, 
and define z =  x +  T'. Finally,  let zb  be the hypothetical income  distribution 
which,  starting  from  the  pre-tax  vector  z,  would  have  resulted  from  a 
proportional income tax with the same tax revenue as T. Using these concepts, 
we propose the following decomposition 
M(Y) = SM(Y) + EM(Y), 
where 
SM(Y) = {W (x) - W (zb)} / W(Yb) = {I(z) - I(x)} / (1- I(y»,  (11) 
and 
EM(Y) = {W(z~  - W (Yb)}/W(Yb) = {I(y) - I(z)}}/ (1- I(y».  (12) 
Equation  (11)  measures  the  welfare  change  induced  by the  tax  system if all 
permutations between x and T would have been eliminated in a hypothetical 
situation in  which  the  pre-tax in  come  distribution  adjusts  -becoming  z- in 
order for  the  after-tax  income  distribution  to  rema  in  equal  to  the  original 
vector x. Equation (12) measures the welfare change induced by the two types of 
permutations between x and T we have discussed. 
Remark. In general, 
l(z)E{Min(l(x), I(T», Max(l(x), I(T»}, 
so that 
SM(Y) ~ O  ~  I(T)?! I(x). 
<  < 
(13) 
19 If there is no perrnutation between x and T, then T' = T,  z = y , EM(Y)  = 
O, and  M(Y) = SM(Y), i. e. , aH rnobility is structural rnobility. In addition, since 
there is no perrnutation between yand T, not only is equation (13) satisfied but 
also equation (10) as in the hornogeneous case. 
If there is sorne perrnutation between x and T, because our definition of 
income mobility is given in equation (9) rather than (8), then by Theorern 1. i) 
we have  that EM(· ) <  O,  that is,  in the  incorne  tax rnodel  perrnutations  are 
always welfare decreasing. As in the income growth rnodel, we can sign M(· ) 
in a number of cases. In the first place, if I(T)  s  I(x), then by (13) SM(· ) s  O and, 
therefore,  M(·  ) <  o.  In the second place, consider a case in which there is  no 
reranking between x and y. For instance, consider the income-tax pair y# =  {x#, 
T#} = {(6, 12), (6, 2)} with the pre-tax income distribution y#  =  (12, 14). It is clear 
that I(x#) > I(y#), so that M(Y#) <  O.  To understand  this  example,  notice  that 
T#' =  (2,  6)  and z#  =  x#  + T#'. Because  I(T#)  >  I(x#),  by (13),  SM(Y#)  >  o. 
However,  the  permutations  involved  in  such  an  absolutely  regressive  tax 
vector  cause  a  negative  and  large  exchange  mobility  component  which 
dominates  the structural mobility  effect.  Of course,  this  example  is  but one 
instance of the application of Theorem 1. ii) to the income tax model. 
Consider the foHowing  example, iHustrated in Figure 3, of a reranking 
between x and y.  The pre-tax in  come  distribution  is  y&  =  (9,  6).  There  is  a 
progressive  tariff which leads to  the  tariff vector  TI =  (4,  2).  There  is  also  a 
vector of tax credits e = (O, 1.5). Therefore the total or effective tax vector is T& 
20 =  (4, 0.5) -a very progressive one- while the after-tax vector is x&  =  (5, 5.5). Let 
y&  = {x&,  T&}.  Notice  that T&' = (0.5,  4)  and z&  = x&  + T&' = (5.5,  9.5). The 
adverse consequences of the permutation between x&  and T&  are reflected in 
the  fact  that  EM(Y&)  <  O.  The  positive  welfare  consequences  of  the 
progressivity of T&  are reflected in the fact that SM(Y&) > O. This effect offsets 
the previous one, so that M(Y&) > O,  reflecting the positive RE  we have learnt 
to expect from a progressive tax system, even in the (unwelcome)  presence of 
rerankings between pre-tax and after-tax incomes. 
Figure 3 about here 
Of course,  in  other  cases  the  exchange  mobility  can  dominate  the 
structural mobility yielding a negative  overall  mobility  measurement.  A  key 
feature of our model is  that we do not  impose  any value judgments  on the 
deleterious effects of the rerankings between x and y induced byan income  tax. 
But  an  application  of  Theorern  2  shows  that,  whenever  there  is  sorne 
reranking between the  pre-tax  and  the  after-tax  incorne  distributions,  there 
exists sorne new tax systern T* with the sarne tax revenue as T which gives rise 
to the sarne incorne rnobility but generates no reranking at all. 
This  tax vector is  defined by T*  = y&' - x&,  where y&'  is  the  pre-tax 
vector ordered as x& . In the previous exarnple, T* = (1, 3.5). If  we now define x/\ 
= y& -T/\, where T/\ is the tax vector T*  ordered as y&,  then we have that x/\ is 
sirnply the original after-tax vector x&  ordered as y&. Thus, the income-tax pair 
Y/\ = {x/\, T/\} with y/\ = x/\ + T/\ = y&,  has  the  sarne  incorne  rnobility  as  the 
21 original one, but without any reranking between x" and y&.  Notice that T" is 
still progressive, but since I(T") <  I(T&), we have eliminated what we may caH 
the "excess progressivity" which was causing the reranking between y& and x&. 
A consequence of this reduction in inequality is that the social welfare of the 
tax vector is increased: W (T") - W (T&) =  ~(T&) (I(T&) - I(T"»  > o. On the other 
hand,  the  progressivity  reduction  may  have  positive  incentive  effects  on 
economic activity, an issue beyond the scope of this papero 
Finally, we are in a position to disentangle the effect of the two types of 
permutations between x and T in the income  tax model. Consider an income-
tax pair Y = {x, T}, with y = x + T, where there are sorne permutations between x 
and T. Let M(Y) = SM(Y) + EM(Y). If there are no  rerankings between x and y, 
then EM(Y) measures how important are the consequences of the fact that the 
tax vector T is absolutely regressive.  If there  are rerankings between x and y, 
then EM(Y) may capture the impact of both types of permutatíons. Let y"  =  {x", 
T"}, with y = x" + T"  be the income-tax pair in which aH  rerankings have been 
eliminated  after  applying Theorem  2.  If there  are  still  sorne  permutations 
between x" and T", then M(Y") =  SM(Y") + EM(Y"), where EM(Y") mea  sures 
the effect of permutations due solely to the fact that T" is absolutely regressive. 
In this case, the difference between EM(Y) and EM(Y") allows us to estímate the 
exchange mobility due exclusively to the reranking between x and y caused ~ 
the excessively progressive tax vector T. Of course, if there are no permutations 
between x" and T", then EM(Y") = O,  M(Y") = SM(Y") and EM(Y)  provides a 
direct measure of the extent of the rerankings. 
22 IV. OTHER APPLICA  TIONS 
In this section we will briefly describe other applications of these  two-
period models. 
IV. 1. The Impact of Different Assumptions About Equivalence Scales 
As  we have  pointed  out in Section TII,  in  the  real  world  we  have 
information about a set of heterogeneous individuals -tax units or households-
with  different  characteristics  and  different  needs.  In  income  distribution 
theory,  one  usually  takes  into  account  different  needs  due  to  different 
demographic charaderistics. For simplicity, in what follows  we only  consider 
the household size. Units of the same size are assumed to have the same needs 
and,  therefore,  their  incomes  are  directly  comparable.  However,  social 
evaluation  within  individual  subgroups need  not  yield  unanimous  results. 
Moreover, it is always convenient to extract conclusions for the population as a 
whole.  Therefore,  we need  a procedure to  establish welfare comparisons  for 
households of different size. This is,  of course, the role played by equivalence 
scales. 
We  as sume  that  larger  units  have  greater  needs,  but  also  greater 
opportunities  to  achieve  economies  of  scale  in  consumption.  Assume  that 
there are k = l,  ... ,K unit sizes. Following Buhman el al. (1988) and Coulter el al. 
(1992a,  1992b), for  each household  i of size k  define  adjusted income  in  the 
relati  ve  case ~ 
23 (14) 
Taking a single adult as the reference type, the expression k8  can be interpreted 
as the number of equivalent adults in a household of size k. Thus, the greater 
is 8, the  greater the  number of equivalent  adults  in  each household  or,  in 
other words, the smaller the economies of scale. When 8  = O  and economies of 
scale are assumed to be infinite,  adjusted in  come  coincides  with unadjusted 
household income; while if 8  = 1 and economies of scale are completely ruled 
out, then adjusted income equals per  capita household income. 
According to the empirical literature, the inequality of adjusted income 
follows  a U  pattern as a function  of 8(18).  However,  these  are  not  the  only 
changes which take place:  the  relative  positions  of units  of different size are 
drastically altered as 8  varies from O to 1. The reason is found in the positive 
association we observe between income  and unit size. Thus, when economies 
of scale are assumed  to  be infinite  and 8  =  O,  single  person units  tend to  be 
poorer relative to large ones. The opposite is the case as economies of scale lose 
importance when 8  rises toward 1. It is well known that this  reordering may 
influence decisively the study of poverty as well as international comparisons 
of  inequality  in  the  presence  of  large  differences  in  demographic 
characteristics(19).  The  question  we  want  to  address  here  is:  how  can  we 
measure the welfare effect caused by such reorderings? 
24 Let 8 2 > 8  1.  Taking into  account  (14),  for  each i with ki  ~ 2 adjusted 
income for 8  2 is smaller than for 8 1. Let us denote the difference by ei . If we 
denote the corresponding vectors by y(8  2)' y(8  1) and e, then we have that y(8 2) 
=  y(8 1) - e. Therefore we can apply the  analysis developed for the  in  come  tax 
model to the pair Y = {y(8 1)' e}. 
IV. 2. Tax-benefit Models 
We  suggest reinterpreting the income  tax model  in a situation where 
we have  microeconomic  information on both tax and public benefits for a set 
of individuals. Let y be the vector of benefits, T the  vector of taxes, and x the 
vector  of net benefits where x = y-T. We  may caH  Y = {x,  T}  a  tax-benefit 
system. As in the income tax model, we are interested in rerankings between y 
and x which  cause  permutations  between  x  and  T.  But  there  can be  other 
permutations  between x and  T  due  to  the  fact  that  sorne  individuals  who 
receive  low  net  benefits  are  paying  larger  taxes  than  other  individuals 
receiving high net benefits. The index M(· ) defined in equation (9)  measures 
the  income  mobility  due  to  the  tax  benefit  system  as  a  whole.  The 
decomposition in equations (11) and (12) is useful to  measure the importance 
of the rerankings between gross and net benefits induced by the tax system. 
To  deal  with  the  problem  that  x  may  involve  individuals  with 
negative  net  benefits,  we  may  use  a  SEF  which  can  be  expressed  as  the 
difference between the mean and an index of absolute inequality (See note 13). 
25 Alternatively,  we  may  partition  the  sample  into  those  individuals  with 
positive  and negative  net  benefits.  To  analyze  the  second  group,  we  may 
consider a model with the vector of net taxes t  =  T - Y as the reference vector, 
that is, an income structure Y =  {t, y}. 
Typica1ly,  we are also interested in the  impact of net benefits on the 
distribution of income  before the  intervention  of the  public  sector.  We  can 
study this problem with the help of the  income  growth model developed in 
Section 11.  Let  Yl  be the  income  distribution before public benefits and taxes, 
and let Y2 be the  vector  of net benefits (called x in the  previous  application). 
Then Y = {Yl' Y2} with the aggregate or the final situation given by Ya  = Yl  + Y2. 
Our  concepts  permit  to  study  both  the  impact  of  differences  in  income 
inequality  between Yl  and Y2'  as  well as  the  effect  of  permutations  between 
these  two  distributions  -with or  without  rerankings  between the  "private" 
income distribution Yl and the net benefit distribution Y2. 
IV. 3. Different Income Sources 
In income distribution theory, we are often interested in evaluating the 
distributional  implications  of  adding up two  different  income  sources.  For 
example, let us denote by Yl the earnings distribution of household heads. We 
want to know the consequences of adding up the spouses earnings inc1uded in 
vector Y2. In our terminology, Y =  {Yl'  Y2}  constitutes an income structure. The 
mobility  index  provides  a  measure  of  the  welfare  effect  of  adding  up  the 
earnings of household heads and their spouses. In terms of  our model,  there 
26 are two forces influencing the sign and magnitud  e of M(Y): i) the difference in 
the earnings inequality of the two groups, and ii) the impact of permutations 
between YI and Y2' with or without reranking between YI and Ya= YI + Y2· 
IV. 4. Dynasties 
In income mobility theory, what we are often interested in is the extent 
to which parents determine the positions occupied by their sons and daughters. 
Assume we have a procedure to express a person's life cyc1e income stream ~ 
means of a scalar. Let YI be the parents life cyc1e income  distribution, and let Y2 
be the descendants life cyc1e income distribution. Again, Y = {YI'  Y2}  constitutes 
an income structure to which we can apply our concepts. In this model,  Ya= Yl 
+ Y2  can be interpreted as  the  dynastic income  distribution.  Quite  naturally, 
income mobility arises from a comparison between the welfare of the dynasties 
in  the  actual income  structure,  W (Ya),  and the  welfare of the  dynasties in  a 
hypothetical benchmark structure Yb: the income  structure which would have 
resulted  if  descendants life  cyc1e  incomes  have  the  same  inequality  as  their 
parents life cyc1e incomes. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
The  literature  on measures  of  relative  income  mobility  studies  two 
types  of  income  changes  which  can  be  observed  with  longitudinal  data: 
changes in cross-section income  inequality,  and changes in relative  incomes. 
27 Within  the  limits  of  a  two  period  model,  we  have  suggested  a  way  to 
decompose CDW ethical index of relative mobility into an index of structural 
mobility and an index of exchange mobility which capture the welfare effect of 
these two types of income changes. In so doing, we have shown the relevance 
of distinguishing between two types of reorderings: permutations between the 
first- and  second-period  income  distributions,  and  rerankings  between  the 
initial and the aggregate or final situation. 
We have used these indices to study the changes induced by an income 
tax in a heterogeneous world in which tax units may differ in income and/or 
non-income  characteristics. We  have  shown that our mobility  index has the 
same sign that the redistributive effect in the income tax literature, namely, the 
difference  between  pre-tax  and  after-tax  income  inequality.  Our  exchange 
mobility index can be used to  measure  the  extent of rerankings  between the 
pre-tax and after-tax income distributions, which is viewed by some authors as 
a measure of horizontal inequality. 
In the  income  growth  model,  exchange  mobility  is  always  welfare 
enhancing, while the opposite is the case in the income tax model. AIso,  in the 
presence  of  rerankings  we  have  shown  that  there  exists  a  second-period 
income  distribution which generates the  same effects  as  the  original one but 
involves  no reranking at aH.  In the income  tax context, this implies  that it is 
always possible to eliminate the horizontal inequities without detracting from 
the redistributive effect and the tax revenue of the original tax system. 
From a conceptual point of view, we should emphasize that all of the 
above  has  been  accomplished  in  the  framework  chosen  by  CDW  which, 
28 contrary to the seminal contribution by King (1983), does not involve  any new 
value judgments  on either permutations  or rerankings.  In particular, we do 
not  put  positive  value  on  rerankings  in  an  income  growth  context,  nor 
negative value when the rerankings are induced byan excessively progressive 
income tax. 
We believe that in problems where there are individual rank reversals, 
our  approach  is  immediately  applicable.  We  have  shown  that  there  are  a 
number  of  interesting  applications  even  in  the  simple  two  dimensional 
models  developed  in  this  papero  However,  the  greatest  limitation  of  this 
approach is possibly the restriction to a two period world. 
The extension to a truly multiperiod context must start with a model of 
how to evaluate, from an ethical point of view,  a multiperiod income stream 
at the individual leve!.  On the  other hand, if the  present two period model 
were to be naively extended to three or more periods, we know that the results 
depend on the decision about the reference periodo Therefore,  one would have 
to  come  up  with  an  appropiate  suggestion  for  the  notion  of  an  immobile 
income structure in a multiperiod context. 
Once these difficulties are solved, a multiperiod model can be applied 
to  other  problems  which  involve  rank  reversals.  A  possible  dynamic 
application would be the  measurement  of convergence  between countries or 
regions. In a static context, we may extend the analysis suggested in Section IV. 
3 and IV. 4. to any number of income sources and dinasties, respectively. 
29 APPENDIX 
, 
Theorern 1. Let Y =  (Y1' Y2)E02 so that Y2  ~ Y2  and  Ye ~ Ya' i.e. so that there is 
sorne perrnutation between Y1 and Y2.  i)  EM(Y) >  O.  ii) If  I(Y1)  ~ I(Y2)  or there is 
no reranking between Y1 and Ya' then M(Y) > O. 
Proof of i): 
That there is sorne  permutation between Y1  and Y2'  means  that there 
exists at least a pair of individuals j < k, such that ~1  s  Y~  but  ~2  > Y~ . Let Y~ 
.,  k  k'· 
be the vector Y2 but ordered as Y1' so that Y2  = Y2  and Y2  = Y2 .  Since Ye  =  Y1  + 
Y2  ,we have that 
k  k  k 
and Ya  =  Y1  + Y2  . Therefore,  Recall that Ya 
k 
< O  and Ya  =  Y~  - ~ > O, which implies that 
.  k  k· 
Ya  < Y e  and Ya  > Ic  . 
.  .  .  k  k  k· 
At the same time, Ya  -Ye  = Y2  -Y2  > O  and Ya  -Ic  = Y2  -Y2  <  O, 
which implies that 
(1) 
Suppose that there is a reranking involving  individuals j and k. Then, 
.  k  .  k 
given that 11  < Y1  ,we must have that 1a  ~ Ya  . By (1), we have: 
Suppose now that there is no reranking involving  individuals j and k, so that 
.  k 
1a  s  Ya  . By (2) we have 
j  j  k  k 
Y e  < Ya  s  Ya  < Y e  . 
30 In both cases, we have I(ya) < I(ye), so that EM(Y) = (I(ye) - I(ya)}/ {l- I(YI)} > O. 
Proof of ii): 
That I(YI)  ~ I(Y2)  irnplies that M(Y) > O was shown in the text. Assurne 
now  that  there  is  sorne  perrnutation  between YI  and  Y2  but no  reranking 
between YI and Ya. This rneans that there exists at least a pair of individuals j < 
.  k  .  k  .  k  .  .  .  .  k 
k,suchthatYI  s  YI  'Y2  >Y2  butYa  <  Ya  .SmceY a  =~ +Y2  andYa 
k  k 
YI  + Y2  we have that 
Therefore 
and hence I(ya) < I(YI)' We conclude that 
Q.E.D. 
Theorem 2. Let Y = (YI' Y2)EnZ so that there is sorne reranking between Yl  and 
* 
Ya· Then, there exists sorne Y2  ED with the following properties: 
*  * 
ii) M(Y*) = M(Y), where Y*  = (Yl' Y2  ); 
*  *  * 
iii) There is no reranking between Yl and Ya  =  Yl + Y2  ; 
Proof: 
*  i I  i 
LetYa  be the vector Ya  ordered as YI'  Define  Y2  = Ya  - YI·  If Ya  =Ya  , 
i*  i  i  i  i I  i  i'  l  l 
then Y2  =Ya  - Yl  =Y2  > O. IfYa  ~  Ya  ,then Ya  =  Yl  + Y2  for sorne 1 > i. 
S'  1  1  i*  1  1  i  *  * 
mce YI  s  YI  'Y2  =YI  +Y2  - YI  > O. Thus, Y2  ED, so that Y*  = (YI'  Y2  ) is 
*  * 
an incorne structure with Ya  = Yl + Y2  = Ya  . 
*  * 
* 
(i). Since I(Ya  ) = I(Ya  ) = I(ya), we have 
31 * 
* 
which is condition (ii). Since  Ya  = Ya  and Ya  is  ordered as  Y1'  there is  no 
* 
reranking between Y1  and Ya  '  which is  condition  (iii).  That  there  is  sorne 
reranking  between  Y1  and  Ya'  rneans  that  there  exists  at  least  a  pair  of 
.  k  .  .  .  k  k  k 
individuals j < k, such that Y 1  < Y1  but Ya  =  Yt  + Y 2  >  Ya  =  Y1  + Y2 
Therefore, 
*  ..  * 
Since by (iii) there is no reranking between Y1 and Ya  ' we have that Yt  + Y2  = 
.,  k  k*  k' 
Ya  < Y1  + Y2  =  Ya  . Therefore, 
By (3) and (4): 
* 
Thus, I(Y2) > I(Y2  ), which is condition (iv). 
Q.E.D. 
32 NOTES 
(1)  For an illuminating  account of  the  main  features  of industrial 
society, see Gellner (1983, 1994). 
(2) Among the descriptive measures,  see Shorrocks  (1978a),  Geweke 
et  al  (1986),  and  Conlisk  (1990);  among  the  normative  ones,  see  Atkinson 
(1983), Markandya (1982,  1984),  Conlisk  (1989)  and Dardadoni (1993).  In most 
cases,  transition  matrices  are assumed  to  follow  a Markov  chain,  a  property 
often rejected in empirical analysis (see Fields and Ok (1996)  for references  to 
the empirical literature). 
(3) See Hart (1976), Shorrocks (1993), and Conlisk (1974). 
(4)  For  descriptive  measures,  see  the  relative  indices  suggested t:r 
Shorrocks (1978b)  and Cowell (1985),  and the  absolute indices  due to  Berrebi 
and Silber (1983) and Fields and Ok (1996). 
(5)  For  other  versions  of  S(.)  see,  for  instance,  Maasoumi  and 
Zandvakili (1989,  1990), based on Maasoumi (1986),  as well as  the  criticism of 
them by Dardadoni (1990). For another approach to the construction of lifetime 
income, see Cowell (1979). 
(6) In the absolute case, the benchmark structure Yb would be chosen 
to be absolutely immobile, i.e. income  differences would be preserved through 
time. 
* 
(7) In the absolute case, we would have M  A (Y)  =  <1>{W (Ya)  - W (y~}, 
where <1>:  R~+ -+ Rl is a continous increasing function with <1>  (O)  =  O. 
33 (8) In their discussion about the  proper unit of egalitarian concern, 
McKerley  (1989)  and Tempkin  (1992)  call  assumption  2  the  complete  lives 
v i e  w.  By  means of similar examples,  they  confront  this  approach with  two 
other alternatives,  induding the simultaneous  lives  view which  takes  only 
into  account  the  sequence  of cross-section  income  distributions.  From  this 
perspective, Y would be preferable to Y  #. 
(9)  Shorrocks  (1978a)  justifies  A.  4.  as  a  direct  application  in  the 
intertemporal context of the population replication axiom, usually assumed in 
income  distribution  theory  in  order  to  compare  the  income  inequality  of 
populations of different size. 
(10)  A  SEF function W (.  ) is weakly-homothetic if and only if for all 
mcome  distributions x, y ED with the  same mean,  W (x)  ~ W (y)  ~  W (a  x)  ~ 
W (ay) for all a>  O.  In the absolute case, the SEF W (.  ) is expressed in terms of 
the  mean  and  a  translatable  index  of  absolute  inequality.  When  W (.)  is 
regular, this is the case if and only if W (.  ) is 'increasing along the rays paraHel 
to  the line of equality and weakly-translatable. A  SEF  is  weakly-translatable if 
and only if for aH  income  distributions x,  yED with the  same mean,  W (x)  ~ 
W (y) ~  W (x + Ae)  ~  W (y + Ae), where e is a vector of ones and A is such that (x 
+ Ae), (y + Ae)ED. (See Dutta and Esteban (1992». 
(11) See, for instance, Blackorby and Donaldson (1978). 
(12) See Herrero and Vi llar (1989) and Ruiz-Castillo (1995a). 
(13) In the absolute case, we would choose  <1>(s)  =  s so that M A (Y)  = 
W (Ya) - W (Yb)' If  we assume that W(.)  is regular, increasing along rays parallel 
34 to the ray of equality, and translatable, then W (y) =  ~(y) - IKBD(y), where IKBD(.) 
is  the  absolute  inequality  index  obtained  according  to  the  Kolm-Blackorby-
Donaldson  procedure  (See  Kolm  (1976a,  1976b)  and  Blackorby  and 
Donaldson(1980».  Because  of  its  decomposability  properties,  for  operational 
KP 
purposes we would choose the Kolm-Pollak family of SEFs,  W d  (.)  , where d 
is a parameter reflecting different degrees of aversion to absolute inequality. In 
KP  KP  KP 
this case,  W d  (y)  =  ~(y) - Id  (y)  , where Id  (.)  is the Kolm-Pollak index of 
KP 
absolute  inequality  consistent  with  W d  (.)  (See  Blackorby  and  Donaldson 
(1980». In either case,  the  absolute mobility  index would be M A  (Y) = lA (Yl)  -
KP 
IA(Yb), with IA(.) equal to IKBD(.) or  Id  (.)  . 
(14)  See  the  discussion  about  this  notions  in  Markandya  (1984)  and 
Shorrocks (1993), and the references to the sociologicalliterature quoted there. 
(15) In the  re  la ti ve  case,  see  the  seminal  paper by Jacobsson (1976)  or 
Pfingsten (1988) and the references quoted there. In the absolute case, see Moyes 
(1988). 
(16) For our contribution  to  this  debate, see Ruiz-Castillo  and Vargas 
(1997). 
(17) See, for example, Berliant and Strauss (1985), Aronson et al.  (1994) 
and Ruiz-Castillo and Vargas (1997). 
(18) This is indeed the pattern reported by Coulter et al.  (1992a,  b)  for 
the UK, by Rodrigues (1993) for Portugal, and by Ruiz-Castillo (1995b, 1998) for 
Spain. 
3S (19) For the impact on poverty, see Lanjouw and Ravallion  (1995) and 
Del Río  and Ruiz-Castillo (1997).  For the impact on international comparisons 
of inequality, see Burkhauser et al. (1996) and Garner et al. (1997). 
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FIGURE  3 
y  =  pre-tax income distribution =  (9, 6)  T  =  tax vector =  (4, 0.5)  x  =  y  - T  = 
after-tax income distribution =  (5, 5.5)  T' = tax vector ordered  as  x  =  (0.5,4) 
z  =  x + T' =  (5.5,9.5)  y' =  pre-tax vector ordered as  x 
1"  = tax vector which generates the same  tax revenue and  income mobility but 
no rerankings = (3.5, 1)  x" =  after tax vector ordered as  y 